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Raising employment has been at the heart of EU strategies for over twenty years. Social
investment, by now a widely debated topic in the comparative welfare state literature, has been
suggested as a way to pursue this. However, there are only a couple of systematic comparative
analyses that focus on the employment outcomes associated with social investment. Analyses
of the interdependence of these policies with regard to their outcomes are even more scarce.
We empirically analyse the extent to which variation in employment rates within  OECD
countries over the period - can be explained by effort on five social investment
policies. We additionally explore the role of policy and institutional complementarities.
Using time-series cross-section analyses we find robust evidence for a positive association
between effort on ALMPs and employment rates. For other policies we obtain mixed results.
ALMPs are the only policies for which we observe signs of policy interdependence, which point
at diminishing marginal returns. Additionally, our analysis demonstrates that the interdepen-
dence of social investment policies varies across welfare state regimes. Together, this indicates
that the employment outcomes of social investment policies are also contingent on the broader
framework of welfare state policies and institutions.
Keywords: employment; social investment; policy complementarity; institutional
complementarity; diminishing marginal returns; comparative welfare state analysis
JEL codes: H; I; J
1. Introduction
For over twenty years, realising higher employment levels has been at the heart
of EU strategies such as the Lisbon Strategy and Europe . To realise the
goals explicated in these strategies, the European Commission launched the
Social Investment Package in . In it, the Commission advocated a ‘new
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approach’ that involves “investing in social policies, services and cash benefits
which both activate and enable” (: ). Specifically, the Commission urged
member states to “better reflect social investment in the allocation of resources
[by] putting greater focus on policies such as (child)care, education, training,
active labour market policies, housing support, rehabilitation and health serv-
ices” (: ). This approach is in line with the broader academic discourse
on the sustainability of the welfare state, which describes the need of reorienting
social policy towards programmes aimed at activation and human capital
development to prepare individuals for the new social risks of the service-based
economy (Taylor-Gooby, ; Armingeon and Bonoli, ).
Social investment has been presented as a promising strategy to reduce pov-
erty and to realise economic growth. Since higher employment rates have been
considered an important intermediate step to achieve these goals, social and
labour market policies should be oriented at raising employment, possibly even
at the expense of classical redistributive welfare state programmes (Van Vliet
and Wang, ; Garritzmann et al., ; Van Vliet et al., ). In the social
investment literature, it has been stressed that the outcomes of individual poli-
cies highly depend on their interdependence and the institutional context
(Bouget et al., ; Hemerijck et al., ; Dräbing and Nelson, ).
Remarkably, empirical insights into these interdependencies and this holistic
perspective, regarding the effectiveness of social investment policies in general
and with respect to employment outcomes in particular, are very limited.
Hemerijck et al. () is the only study that empirically examines the comple-
mentarity between two social investment policies. These authors employ an
international comparative analysis in order to exploit the variance between,
on the one hand, the interdependencies between social investment policies
and, on the other hand, employment rates.
This study aims to complement the social investment literature by empiri-
cally analysing the association between effort on social investment policies and
employment rates in  OECD countries over the period -. In contrast
to earlier comparative studies that analysed variation between countries –
namely, the extent to which expenditures on social investment are correlated
with employment levels (Nelson and Stephens, ; Taylor-Gooby et al.,
) – our study is focused on the developments within countries. Hence,
we analyse associations between changes in effort on social investment policies
and changes in employment rates within countries. This approach has also been
used by Ahn and Kim () and Hemerijck et al. (). With respect to these
two studies, we seek to make three contributions. First, acknowledging the com-
prehensive perspective of the social investment literature on welfare states, we
include a broader range of social investment policies. Second, this study extends
the work on policy complementarities by Hemerijck et al. () by also taking
the institutional context into account. In line with holistic perspectives in the
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conceptual and theoretical social investment literature, we examine how policy
complementarities are dependent on differences in broader configurations of
welfare state institutions across countries. Third, we use more sophisticated
measures of effort on social investment that account for demographic and eco-
nomic conditions.
2. Literature review and theory
2.1 The social investment state and social investment policies
Throughout the s, social investment arose as a product of new ideas
regarding the role of social policy and its relation to the economy. Central to
this notion of social investment is the idea that social policies can be seen as
productive factors that generate positive returns to the economy by enhancing
economic participation and realising economic growth (Midgley, ). This
view is also reflected in more recent literature that defines the social investment
state as “an institution that puts the emphasis less on income replacement and
more on the promotion of labour market participation through activation and
investment in human capital” (Bonoli and Natali, : ). Instead of offering a
safety net through policies aimed at repairing damages after the occurrence of
personal or economic crises, it provides a trampoline that involves policies
aimed at preparing, supporting and equipping individuals to participate in
the knowledge economy and respond to the new social risks associated with
it (Morel et al., ). Accordingly, the social investment approach has been
formulated in terms of reallocating expenditures on passive transfers to expen-
ditures on activating and capacitating policies that invest in human capital and
help make efficient use of it such as (early childhood) education, life-long
learning, and active labour market policies (ALMPs) (Esping-Andersen, ;
Morel et al., ).
These complementary functions of social investment can be linked to a
variety of policies concerned with different stages of the life-course. Most empir-
ical studies have concentrated on ALMPs and early childhood education and
care (ECEC) exclusively (Bonoli, ; Hemerijck et al., ), although some
have considered additional policies like education (Nelson and Stephens, ),
parental leave, and life-long learning (Taylor-Gooby et al., ). Descriptive
studies on the extent to which countries allocate resources to social investment
tend to considerer an even broader range of policies and have also incorporated
other family benefits, home-help and care for the elderly, and services for the
incapacitated (Kvist, ; Kuitto, ; Ronchi, ). Guided by this literature
we distinguish five groups of policies capable of mobilising the productive
potential of individuals: ALMPs, early childhood policies, services for the elderly
and frail, education, and maternity and parental leave.
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2.2 Social investment policies and employment
Employment outcomes are a function of the demand for and the supply of
labour. Social investment can be characterised as a supply-side approach to
social policy, which aims to increase the quantity and quality of employment
through activation and human capital development. The employment effects
associated with different social investment policies can, however, be expected
to differ as they are targeted at different groups of society and operate through
different mechanisms.
ALMPs concern a first type of social investment policy. Policies considered
ALMPs differ in the extent to which they invest in human capital and stimulate
employment through the labour market (Bonoli, ). Policies that score high
on these dimensions and thereby clearly reflect social investment aspects are
placement services, counselling, job-search programmes and training. Based
on an extensive meta-analysis, Card et al. () conclude that programmes
offering job search assistance are associated with positive short term impacts,
whereas the positive effects of programmes focused on human capital develop-
ment manifest themselves in the years following completion of the programme.
While the positive effects of most programmes tend to be the largest for women
and the long-term unemployed, ALMPs can be considered a particularly effec-
tive social investment policy because of the large number of people that partici-
pate in these programmes.
Especially in the context of new social risks associated with increased female
employment, the literature on social investment has discussed the relevance of
policies that enable the reconciliation of work and family life (Plavgo and
Hemerijck, ). The main policy in that regard concerns childcare.
High-quality childcare concerns an investment in children that has proven to
have positive long-term effects on educational and employment outcomes.
Subsidies on childcare may also have more direct employment effects. Due to
the associated costs, effective wages fall when parents organise childcare through
the market. In the absence of publicly subsidised childcare, some therefore
leave the labour market to care for their children. Through expenditures on
childcare and early childhood education facilities, governments can stimulate
(young) parents to engage in paid employment. The effectiveness of these poli-
cies, however, depends on their institutional design. If childcare subsidies lower
the price of public childcare below the market clearing price so that public child-
care is substituted for private childcare, they can be expected to have little to no
effect on employment (Havnes and Mogstad, ). In addition to affordability,
the availability and quality of the services provided matters as well for these pol-
icies to constitute effective social investments (West et al., ).
Services for the elderly and frail, such as residential care and home help,
operate in a similar manner. While the provision of informal eldercare keeps
some people from working entirely, others reconcile work and care by reducing
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working hours or rearranging work schedules. Negative employment effects
might therefore be relatively small and tend to hold for women only
(Viitanen, ; Ciani, ). Still, the public provision of these services can
be expected to stimulate labour market participation amongst those people that
would otherwise provide informal care by enabling them to find a work-life
balance (Taylor-Gooby, ).
Another policy that has widely been discussed in the literature on social
investment concerns education. Both initial education and education during
working life can be expected to have a positive effect on the quality of a country’s
labour force over the medium to long term. A skilled and flexible labour force
fosters competitiveness and thereby constitutes the key to productive and
economic growth in a rapidly changing world (Lundvall and Lorenz, ).
This takes place in an increasingly globalised economy in which knowledge
becomes obsolete more rapidly than before and where the need for manual
labour power has been replaced by the need for skills relevant to the service-
based knowledge economy. In such an economy there is a greater need to invest
in education in order to stimulate employment and facilitate transitions between
jobs and sectors, which are increasingly being made throughout working careers.
Such investments can, on the one hand, be expected to increase attainment and
thereby facilitate a skilled labour force with increased chances of finding a job
and, on the other hand, improve the quality of instruction and thereby foster
human capital development (Nelson and Stephens, ).
Last, childbirth may change the preferences of parents with regard to
employment. Without maternity and parental leave arrangements especially
women are likely to (temporarily) quit employment. While these arrangements
are generally characterised by a cash transfer, they can be considered invest-
ments because they stimulate employment in the long run. When these leave
arrangements are available, people are more likely to utilise this leave period
and return to their pre-childbirth job once it ends (Klerman and Leibowitz,
). Although parental leave may thereby only delay the return to work or
induce mothers that would otherwise find a new job to return to their old
job, most empirical studies show that policies that provide paid leave are
associated with increases in female employment (Akgunduz and Plantenga,
), albeit often resulting in part-time employment (Gutiérez-Domènech,
).
Overall, we hypothesise positive effects for the five social investment
policies we distinguish. Nevertheless, the way in which these positive effects
manifest themselves is likely to differ across the policies considered. Not all
policies are equally relevant in terms of their magnitude and the time horizon
in which they yield returns on the investment. Early childhood policies and
maternity and parental leave are, for example, applicable to young parents only.
Likewise, services for the elderly and frail can be expected to yield positive effects
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for people that care for elders only. While ALMPs and education concern a
broader population of beneficiaries, their effects might be limited in the short
term because the benefits associated with training and schooling are usually
reaped over the life-course. Yet, employment effects might be most pronounced
for ALMPs, because these policies are directly targeted at stimulating employ-
ment, whereas the other policies stimulate employment somewhat indirectly.
2.3 Institutional complementarity and employment
An important insight from the social investment literature is that the
employment outcomes of policies can be reinforced by providing complemen-
tary policies. When introducing the Social Investment Package, the European
Commission (: ) acknowledged that the “investment dimension of a
specific policy expenditure largely depends on its design features, [its] comple-
mentarity with other policies and circumstances in time”. Although the comple-
mentarity of social investment policies has received increasing attention in
recent years, systematic empirical analyses are still scarce.
In the existing literature it has been acknowledged that outcomes of labour
market institutions are contingent on cyclical factors and that the effects of
specific policies depend on other institutions (Benda et al., ). With respect
to social investment specifically, most work centres around the theoretical com-
plementarity of policies over the life-course (Dräbing and Nelson, ;
Hemerijck, ). Hemerijck et al. () concerns the only study that empiri-
cally tests the complementary effect of expenditures on two social investment
policies on employment. Their analysis suggests “some important evidence of
institutional complementarities [ : : : ] where ALMP appears likely to be most
effective in promoting employment particularly where polities also have intro-
duced early-childhood assistance that ease[s] the combination of work and fam-
ily” (Hemerijck et al., : ). We expect such complementarities to apply to
other policy combinations as well. For instance, eldercare also facilitates the rec-
onciliation of work and family life, thereby stimulating employment. ALMPs
could therefore be expected to be more effective in countries that also invest
in services for the elderly and frail. Likewise, positive effects of parental leave
on employment might be reinforced when countries provide adequate levels
of ECEC, thereby easing the transition from temporary leave to work. In addi-
tion, the positive effects of education during adolescence on employability might
be stronger in countries that invest in high-quality childcare during early
childhood.
2.4 Other factors that affect employment
Apart from social investment policies, there are other factors that may affect
employment rates, notably labour market institutions. First, the lay-off costs
associated with employment protection legislation make adjustments to the
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workforce more costly, potentially leading to suboptimal employment levels.
Furthermore, high taxes on labour can be expected to have a negative impact
on employment by increasing the cost of labour and lowering the returns
thereof. Unemployment benefits constitute another relevant factor. Studies
on the generosity of unemployment benefits and resulting labour market
outcomes suggest that benefit generosity mainly affects the duration of unem-
ployment. Nevertheless, high replacement rates can reduce the scar effects of
unemployment, resulting in more employment over the longer run. Last, indus-
trial relations matter as well. Dependent on the bargaining power of trade
unions and the centralisation of wage bargaining, different employment effects
could be expected (Bradley and Stephens, ).
In addition to institutional factors, socioeconomic conditions also play a
role. The size of the dependent population is likely to influence the demand
for care and education. We distinguish between the dependent population below
 (youth) and above  (aged). Furthermore, employment may be influenced
by globalisation, because imports and exports affect the demand for labour.
Finally, employment levels depend on the state of the economy and are sensitive
to shocks in the demand for labour (Nickell et al., ).
3. Data, measures and method
3.1 Variable selection
The dependent variable of this study is the employment rate expressed as
the share of employed people as a percentage of the population (Bradley and
Stephens, ). Given the possibly disturbing effects of extended periods of
schooling and early retirement on employment, this study focuses on the
population of prime working age (-). Besides, we believe social investments
are most likely to affect people within this age group rather than those still in
education or just entering the labour market following education (-) or
approaching retirement (-). In our sensitivity analyses we, however, also
estimate regressions for the entire population of working age (-).
Our independent variables of interest concern effort on five social invest-
ment policies. The operationalisation of these variables strongly follows
Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (). We measure effort using disaggregated
expenditures, whereby expenditures on a specific programme are corrected for
the number of beneficiaries, because expenditures are partly driven by need.
Next, these measures are related to GDP per capita in order to allow for com-
parison across countries and over time. To obtain expenditures on a programme
we use the sum of public and mandatory private expenditures available from the
OECD’s Social Expenditure (SOCX), Labour Market Programmes, and
Ronchi () adopts a comparable approach using Eurostat data.
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Education and Training databases. As data on the number of beneficiaries
of the different policies for the years considered here are not available, we rely
on proxies. Table  shows the precise expenditure categories and beneficiary
groups used.
In operationalising effort on ALMPs we focus on programmes that
clearly reflect social investment aspects such as activation and human capital
development. We only consider expenditures on programmes associated with
Bonoli’s () categories ‘upskilling’ and ‘employment assistance’, corrected
for the number of unemployed. We rely on a rather inclusive definition of early
childhood policies that not only includes ECEC, but also other in-kind services
targeted at (parents of) young children. It excludes cash transfers such as family
allowances. In line with adjustments made to expenditures on ECEC in the
SOCX database to account for cross-national differences in the compulsory
age of entry into primary education, effort on early childhood policies is
corrected for the number of children aged -. Under services for the elderly
and frail we group all in-kind old age and incapacity-related benefits, except for
expenditures on rehabilitation services. Since we do not have data on the num-
ber of incapacitated individuals due to disability, occupational injury and disease
or sickness, these expenditures are corrected for the number of people aged
 and above. Expenditures on education cover direct expenditures on primary,
secondary and tertiary educational institutions (cf. Busemeyer, ). We use
enrolment data to obtain effort per student. As far as we know, no adequate
time-series cross-country expenditure data for education during working life
are available. Effort on maternity and parental leave comprises cash benefit
expenditures on these leave arrangements. Since entitlement is connected to
childbirth, we correct these for the number of new-born children.
Expenditure-based measures have some limitations, because they may not
capture institutional characteristics of welfare programmes. This caveat
notwithstanding, there is relatively little variation in the institutional character-
istics determining eligibility for and entitlement to social investment policies like
eldercare, childcare, and education. Benefits received through these policies
are usually not dependent on past earnings and payments. With regard to
education, access to primary and lower secondary schools tends to be universal.
For such welfare programmes, social expenditures do constitute an adequate
For several countries SOCX does not include expenditures on pre-primary education prior to
. To guarantee comparability over time, these expenditures were added and adjusted to refer
to children aged -.
This probably overestimates effort; the denominator does not include the entire beneficiary
group. Assuming no structural differences in numbers of incapacitated individuals across countries
and over time, this involves no bias.
This covers teacher salaries, investments in school infrastructure and teaching materials, but
excludes tuition payments or transfers to students.
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TABLE . Effort on social investment policies
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measure (Jensen, ). Furthermore, variation in expenditures across or within
countries may not only reflect policy preferences, but may also be the result of
different demographic compositions and economic trends. Our operationalisa-
tion of effort on social investment policies addresses these demographic and
economic aspects. The operationalisation of our control variables, the sources
used, and descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendix (Table A).
3.2 Methodology
Following the availability of data our country sample comprises  OECD
countries. The time series start in . Since data for some of the independent
variables are not available for more recent years, it runs up to . The panel is
somewhat unbalanced, predominantly because Central and Eastern European
countries are observed for shorter time spans. To examine the association
between effort on social investment policies and employment, time-series
cross-section regression analyses are conducted. When examining complemen-
tarity the equation is augmented with multiplicative interaction terms.
We employ two different model specifications to analyse the extent
to which the development of effort on social investment within countries is
associated to their employment rate. The first specification regresses the level
of employment on lagged levels of effort on social investment policies, whereas
the second uses year-to-year changes. Based on several diagnostic tests
(see Appendix ) we include both country and year fixed effects in our first
specification. Our within estimator therefore focuses on variation within coun-
tries while controlling for common temporal shocks. Panel-corrected standard
errors (PCSE) and Prais-Winsten transformation are used to address spatial
correlation of the errors, panel heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
(Beck and Katz, ).
As described in the theoretical section, some social investment policies can
be expected to have rather direct, short-term impacts, whereas others might
reveal their impact over the medium or long term. This is, however, more appli-
cable to redistributive and inequality effects than employment effects (Verbist,
). Longer time horizons are particularly relevant for education. In the short
run, education might even have a negative impact on the supply of labour as
people participate in education instead of on the labour market. Yet, it should
be noted that measuring long-term returns is analytically difficult and possibly
even impossible (Hemerijck et al., ). We therefore focus on short-term
effects by using one year lags or first-differences for our independent variables.
In our sensitivity analyses we additionally try to capture long-term effects
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US.
The panel is characterised by gaps in the s due to a lack of education expenditure data.
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through the use of error-correction models, which are capable of distinguishing
short-term transitory and long-term structural effects.
4. Results
4.1 Descriptive results
Figure A shows that there is variation in both employment rates and social
investment expenditure across countries and over time. Employment is partic-
ularly high (nearly %) in the Nordic countries, Switzerland and the Czech
Republic. In Southern European countries and Ireland employment levels have
been considerably lower (around -%). Over time employment rates have
risen in practically all countries, albeit to different degrees. In several countries
this is predominantly the result of increases in female employment, notably the
Netherlands and Ireland. The Czech Republic and Estonia are the only countries
that experienced decreases in overall employment. Following the economic
crisis, decreases can be observed in nearly all countries after , although there
is a lot of variation in the magnitude of these changes.
Expenditures on social investment have, generally, increased over time and
are positively associated with employment rates (Figure A). Table A presents
effort on the five social investment policies separately. It shows that different
types of welfare states prioritise different social investment policies. Across
countries efforts on all social investment policies except ALMPs have converged
towards a higher level over time. Nevertheless, the data exhibit great variation in
terms of the level of effort and developments thereof.
When it comes to effort on ALMPs the Nordic countries are the most
generous. Some conservative welfare states such as France and Germany attain
similar levels, whilst efforts in liberal and Central Eastern European countries
are relatively low. With regard to policies related to care, the Nordic countries
again stand out as most generous, whereas efforts by liberal, Mediterranean and
Central Eastern European countries are relatively low. Efforts by conservative
welfare states are somewhat more generous, but nowhere near those found in
Nordic welfare states. Still, there is a lot of variation within these groups of
welfare states. Efforts on education exhibit the least variation across countries
and this has even decreased over time. This convergence is to a large extent
the result of catch-up amongst some of the countries traditionally characterised
by relatively low efforts. With respect to maternity and parental leave, the data
show that Central and Eastern European countries have overtaken the Nordic
countries in terms of resources allocated to every recipient. In recent years,
liberal and Mediterranean welfare states have also increased their efforts on this
policy, but they still rank amongst countries with relatively low efforts, which
also includes most of the conservative welfare states.
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4.2 Regression analyses
The results of the regression analyses obtained through our two model
specifications are presented in Table . For both specifications we first analyse
the association between employment and effort on ALMPs and early childhood
policies while controlling for labour market institutions and socioeconomic
factors. The reason for this is twofold. These policies have figured most promi-
nently within the literature on social investment (Bonoli, ; Hemerijck et al.,
). Besides, the effects associated with these policies can be expected to be
larger than those for the other social investment policies that are confined to
smaller groups of society (services for the elderly and frail and maternity
and parental leave) or require considerably longer time horizons to manifest
themselves (education).
Both specifications indicate that effort on social investment-oriented
ALMPs is positively associated with employment in the short term (models 
and ). This association is retained when controlling for additional social invest-
ment policies (models  and ). More specifically, a one percentage point
increase in expenditures on ALMPs per unemployed as a share of GDP per cap-
ita is associated with a .-. percentage point increase in the employment
rate. We find no significant correlations for effort on early childhood policies.
While other studies found high spending on these policies to be associated with
high levels of employment (Nelson and Stephens, ), our results suggest that
changes in the level of effort are not associated with short-term changes in coun-
tries’ level of employment. This result could potentially be explained by the fact
that (female) labour supply elasticities have decreased due to increasing partici-
pation (Blau and Kahn, ; Heim, ), thereby making the labour force less
responsive to changes in effort on early childhood policies.
Subsequently, we augment our model with effort on three other social
investment policies. We obtain positive associations for effort on services for
the elderly and frail, which is in line with studies describing the manner in which
the public provision of these services creates formal care markets that facilitate
labour market participation by enabling people that would otherwise provide
informal care to find a better work-life balance (Taylor-Gooby, ;
Simonazzi, ). As for effort on early childhood policies, we neither obtain
a significant coefficient for effort on education. This is probably due to the short
time horizon being studied. In our model specified in levels, we find effort on
maternity and parental leave to be negatively associated with employment.
Although this contradicts our theoretical expectation, it aligns with findings that
more generous and particularly long leave policies decrease labour market
attachment and hence reduce returns to work, resulting in labour market exits
(Lalive and Zweimüller, ). The coefficient is, however, not statistically
significant in our model in first-differences.
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TABLE . Regressions of employment and effort on social investment
policies, -




Independent variables: Lagged (xi,t–)
First-differenced
(Δxi,t)
() () () ()
Effort on social investment policies
Active labour market policies .
∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Early childhood policies –. –. . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)









Employment protection legislation –. –. .
∗∗ .∗
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Tax wedge –.
∗∗∗ –.∗∗∗ . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Unemployment benefits –. –. . –.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Trade union density . .
∗∗ –. .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Coordination of wage bargaining . . .
∗∗ .∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Socioeconomic factors
Dependent population<  –.
∗∗∗ –.∗∗∗ –. .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Dependent population≥  .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Capital openness . –. –. –.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Trade openness .
∗∗∗ .∗∗ .∗∗ .∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Real GDP per capita .
∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.)




∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ –.∗∗∗ –.∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Number of observations    
Adjusted R-squared . . . .
Rho . . . .
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No No
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; ∗p< ., ∗∗p< ., ∗∗∗p< ..
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4.3 Sensitivity analyses
We conducted extensive sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of
our results. The positive estimate for ALMPs is robust to the exclusion of
different variables, whereas estimates for the other policies are generally also
replicated (Appendix ). Additionally, our estimates for the five social invest-
ment policies are robust to different operationalisations (Appendix ). The signs
are always in the same direction, except when replacing effort on education by
educational attainment (cf. Nelson and Stephens, ). Using this alternative
measure yields estimates that are in line with the theoretical expectations.
We also estimated our preferred model including additional variables to test
for omitted variable bias (Appendix ). All our results are replicated.
Additionally, the use of a different estimation technique (error-correction
models) leads to substantively similar results (Appendix ). Finally, we repeated
our analysis by focusing on the population of working age and additionally
estimated separate models for men and women, because there is a vast literature
that documents differences in labour supply elasticities (Evers et al., ).
We obtain rather similar results when focusing on these slightly different groups
(Appendix ).
4.4 Policy complementarities
Next, we explore the role of policy and institutional complementarities in
the assessment of the employment effects of social investment by examining
whether the results for the different policies presented in Table  are contingent
on other policies and welfare state institutions. In the social investment litera-
ture, two types of ‘institutional complementarities’ can be discerned. On the one
hand, individual policies can have complementary effects over the life-course.
Such temporal complementarities result from the fact that policies positively
affect individual opportunities at a certain stage of the life-course and thereby
improve the effectiveness of other policies at later stages. On the other hand,
policies can complement each other by being targeted toward the same goal.
These complementarities have also been referred to as ‘life-course synergies’
and ‘policy synergies’ (Hemerijck et al., ).
Since our data do not enable us to examine cumulative effects of policies
over the life-course, we examine the second type using interaction effects and
interpret them with marginal effect plots. The two different model specifica-
tions presented above yield substantively highly comparable results. For our
analyses of complementarities we prioritise the model specified in levels. The
reason for this is that the employment outcomes of social investment are not
simply a function of absolute changes, but also depend on the levels.
Marginal effects plots are computed using % confidence intervals. Following conventions, the
presented range of the moderating variable excludes the lower and upper five percent of observations.
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For instance, in countries with high levels of both spending and employment,
increases in the former can be expected to yield smaller employment effects than
similar increases in countries characterised by lower levels of spending and
employment. We analyse ‘policy complementarities’ first by testing whether
simultaneous efforts on specific policy combinations have a complementary
effect on employment. All possible interactions were systematically considered.
The results are summarised in Table .
We obtain statistically significant interaction effects for just two policy
combinations. The other combinations show no signs of policy interdepen-
dence. The low prevalence of interdependence might seem surprising, but other
scholars obtained comparable results. For a comparable time-series cross-
section of countries Hemerijck et al. (: ) find that ALMPs and ECEC
“tend to interact positively though not significantly with one another”.
Similarly, Thévenon’s (: –) analysis of the interplay between family
and care policies with regard to female employment “provide[s] little evidence
that policies complement each other : : : [although this] lack of statistical sig-
nificance regarding many of the ‘paired interaction terms’ does not necessarily
mean that institutions do not interact.”
Figures  and  present the marginal effect plots of our significant interactions.
Hemerijck et al. () examined the first interaction too and argue that ALMPs
are more effective in stimulating employment when countries provide for child-
care, thereby enabling employees to reconcile work and family. A similar argument
can be assumed to apply to care for the elderly and frail, the second interaction. The
figures, however, challenge this argument. The marginal effects of effort on ALMPs
on employment are positive in both cases, but get smaller at higher levels of effort
on the moderating policies. This suggests that, in the presence of relatively high
efforts on early childhood policies and services for the elderly and frail, part of
the positive association between ALMPs and employment is captured by these
policies, as the provision of care also stimulates employment. Instead of a comple-
mentary effect, which would involve upward sloping marginal effects, our results
for these two policy combinations suggest diminishing marginal returns.
This does, however, not imply that social investment has no or negative effects
in relation to employment. Rather, it implies that for those policies that show no
signs of interdependence the returns of this policy are not reinforced when efforts
on a complementary policy are increased. Moreover, despite finding diminishing
marginal returns, the positive effect of ALMPs is retained in the significant inter-
actions – the marginal effect is always positive.
4.5 Policy and institutional complementarities across welfare
state regimes
Subsequently we examine whether the observed interdependence of
these policies regarding their employment effects is contingent on broader
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TABLE . Policy complementarities of effort on social investment policies
Statistically significant interaction
effects
Interaction effects that are not statistically significant because the marginal effect : : :
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configurations of welfare state institutions, because the question whether social
investment “delivers the wished-for socio-economic outcomes ( : : : ) [depends]
on the institutional and economic context of [countries] that greatly differ from
each other” (Ronchi, : ). Distinct regimes have, for instance, been distin-
guished with regard to the provision and financing of care services for children
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FIGURE . Interaction effect of effort on ALMPs and early childhood policies.
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Effort on services for the elderly and frail (SEF)
FIGURE . Interaction effect of effort on ALMPs and services for the elderly and frail.
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and the elderly, which are associated with different employment models
(Simonazzi, ).
The idea that the effect of individual policies is contingent on the entire
framework of institutions can be traced to Bassanini and Duval () who
interact each institution with the overall institutional framework in assessing
its effect on unemployment. In a comparable study on the effect of family poli-
cies on female employment, Thévenon () examines whether effects
differ across groups of countries by interrelating policy variables with regime
dummies. We adopt a quite similar approach by interacting our policy interac-
tions with welfare state dummies that capture common characteristics of welfare
states belonging to the same regime. Figures  and  distinguish the interactions
presented in Figures  and  across welfare regimes.
Figure  shows that diminishing marginal returns found in Figure  hold
across most welfare states, except for the conservative and Mediterranean where
we do find the complementary effect described by Hemerijck et al. ().
Conservative welfare states have been characterised by limited availability of
childcare (Flynn, ), which could therefore explain the observed comple-
mentarity, whereas Mediterranean welfare states have been characterised by
traditionally low levels of employment that thereby offer stronger potential
for social investment policies, especially considering the fact that these countries
are characterised by relatively large labour supply elasticities (Bargain et al.,
). Similarly, Figure  shows that the diminishing marginal returns found
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FIGURE . Interaction effect of effort on ALMPs and early childhood policies by welfare state
regime.
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While Nordic welfare states are most generous in the provision of
(service-oriented) social investment policies, both figures show diminishing
marginal returns for them. At the same time, they have the highest levels of
(female) employment and therefore tend to have fairly small labour supply
elasticities (Bargain et al., ). In such countries, the potential of higher efforts
on these policies is therefore limited: hence, the lower likelihood of finding com-
plementary effects. More generally, the figures show that policy interdependence
is contingent on the underlying institutions associated with different welfare
state regimes.
5. Conclusion and discussion
In both policy debates and the academic literature, social investment has been
considered an important approach to achieve higher employment rates. Our
empirical analysis provides evidence for positive associations between ALMPs
and employment, but for other social investment policies we obtain mixed
results. To further probe these results, we examine a central argument in the
literature that social investment policies are more effective the more they are
complemented with other social investment policies. Our results suggest that
there is little evidence for such increasing returns. Furthermore, for those poli-
cies for which we do observe signs of interdependence, the results do not point at
increasing but at diminishing marginal returns. In terms of policy implications,
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FIGURE . Interaction effect of effort on ALMPs and services for the elderly and frail by wel-
fare state regime.
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that the returns of a policy are not reinforced when efforts on complementary
policies are increased.
From a more general and theoretical perspective, our results indicate that to
be effective the implementation of social investment requires a more custom-
made approach as the institutional context varies across countries – something
that also follows from our exploration of interdependencies across welfare state
regimes. Additionally, it should be noted that social investment not only aims at
raising employment, but also the quality thereof. Several studies provide empir-
ical support which shows that social investment policies are capable of improv-
ing job quality (Nelson and Stephens, ; Dengler, ).
The limited support for our hypothesised associations might also signal
deficiencies of our methodological approach. Nevertheless, an international
comparative approach is probably the most suited to exploit variation in insti-
tutional configurations for the analysis of policy and institutional interdepen-
dencies with regard to employment outcomes. Yet, such a macro-level
analysis comes with a number of limitations. First, several characteristics of
social investment policies, such as rules and conditions, are not captured by
social expenditure indicators. This could also explain why we find the expected
positive association only between ALMPs and employment, whereas single-
country studies that assess specific policy reforms sometimes do find such effects
for the other policies. In this respect, it should be acknowledged that the latter
studies are better equipped to identify causal effects than a time-series cross-
section analysis. Second, our analysis captures mainly short-term effects, while
several policies are likely to require longer time horizons to capture their effect.
Third, social investment policies may yield substantial effects for specific groups
(e.g. young parents) that are not revealed in analyses of aggregate employment
rates. Again, this might explain the divergence between some of our null
findings and the results in country-specific studies. A fruitful route for further
research seems to be an international comparative analysis at the individual
level that moreover provides sufficient leverage to account for institutional
complementarity.
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